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Abstract 
Objectives 
This paper investigates the impact of Field Court Attendance Notices (FCANs) on rates of 
property crime in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. FCANs are used for relatively minor 
offenses, are issued ‘on the spot’, and provide an alternative to the time consuming process of 
arresting an alleged offender and taking them to the police station for processing. Despite their 
use in NSW for over 20 years, this study is the first to evaluate their impact on crime. 
Methods 
We use data provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. We specify a general dynamic panel data model estimated via the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) estimator, specifically the first-differenced twostep generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimator. 
Results 
For property crime as a whole, in both the short- and long-run, we find no significant 
relationship between the use of FCANS and levels of offending. However, when offending 
rates are disaggregated into 11 sub-categories, we find that in the short-run an increase in the 
use of FCANs leads to statistically significant decreases in the rate of crime for five of the sub-
categories offenses considered (break and enter dwelling; motor vehicle theft; steal from motor 
vehicle; steal from retail store and; steal from dwelling). The long-run results are largely 
consistent with the short-run results in terms of their signs and statistical significance, 
suggesting that the effects persist. 
Conclusions 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper suggests that the use of FCANs is an effective 
and potentially efficient policing strategy for a subset of property offenses, in that offenders 
can be processed at lower cost and long-run rates of certain crimes reduced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There exists a range of strategies in the policing toolbox and the evaluation of their 
effectiveness continues to be of primary interest to police, scholars and policy makers. As 
discussed in more detail below, different police practices can vary along a number of 
dimensions that differentiate, for example, what is done and by whom. Like anything else, the 
types of strategies that are employed by the police and those that are evaluated varies over 
time as approaches fall into and out of favor. For example, in the 1970s, attention was given 
to studying the effects of random patrols, while more recently, research conducted in the 
United States (U.S.) and elsewhere has focused on the effectiveness of geographically 
focused patrol strategies at high crime places – hotspots policing (e.g. Ratcliffe et al., 2011; 
Braga et al., 2012). 
 In this article we focus on a policing strategy that, as far as we are aware, has not been 
implemented in the U.S. but has been employed in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over 
the past 20 years - Field Court Attendance Notices (FCANs). FCANs provide an alternative 
to arresting an alleged offender and taking them to the police station for processing. They are 
issued at a police officer’s discretion and are generally used for relatively minor offences 
such as shoplifting and petty theft. FCANs are issued ‘on the spot’ and provide the accused 
with details of the alleged offense, a date and time they are required to appear at court, and 
the consequences of failing to attend. In other words, distinct from other policing strategies 
that specifically target minor offenses (e.g. removal of graffiti, aggressive use of ticketing for 
ordinance violations and expanded use of arrest authority), FCANs involve the use of a 
summons for an alleged misdemeanor (e.g. petty theft or possession of narcotics) which 
implies the presence of probable cause that under certain circumstances would culminate in 
an arrest, but instead results in a summons to court. Relative to other strategies, FCANs have 
two aims. The first is to allow the police to quickly and efficiently process alleged offenders, 
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thus freeing up police time and resources. The second concerns the use of police powers of 
arrest. From the perspective of the courts, arrest for the majority of people is equivalent to an 
additional penalty and should only be used as a last resort, particularly for minor offenses. 
Moreover, when applied inappropriately, the use of police powers of arrest can impact 
negatively upon public perceptions of police legitimacy (Feerick, 2004). The use of FCANs – 
which do not involve an arrest - is intended to alleviate these two concerns.  
 Although the use of FCANs may be efficient with respect to the processing of 
offenders, it is of course important to know whether the process is effective in reducing both 
short- and long-term offending, and for which types of offenses FCANs are most suited. This 
study addresses these important policing questions for property crimes. Property crime was 
selected because this type of crime accounts for a large proportion of those offenses for 
which FCANs are applied and because many of the other offense categories (e.g. disorderly 
conduct, drug offenses) to which FCANs could be applied are rarely reported to police; rather 
they are usually discovered by them. From an evaluation perspective, the problem with these 
latter offenses is that changes in the rate at which they are recorded may more accurately 
reflect changes in police activity than changes in the absolute level at which offenses occur. 
For the purposes of illustration, Appendix A shows the frequency with which FCANs have 
been applied for different types of offenses in NSW since the inception of their use. 
 This study is unique in that it provides empirical evidence regarding the impact of a 
policing process intended to facilitate the more efficient processing of offenders that, despite 
being implemented for over twenty years in Australia, has yet to be evaluated. Its evaluation 
is important as the strategy represents an additional option in the policing toolkit, and if found 
effective might be worth testing in other countries, including the U.S. The paper proceeds as 
follows. A brief discussion is provided of different types of police strategies, which is 
followed by a discussion of the theories that underpin the use of FCANs. The data used and 
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the method employed are then discussed. Finally, the results and their implications for 
policing and policy are discussed. 
POLICING STRATEGIES 
The policing literature identifies a number of alternative policing strategies. These 
include the standard model of policing (for a discussion, see Weisburd & Eck, 2004), 
community policing (e.g. Skogan & Hartnett, 1997), broken windows policing (Wilson & 
Kelling, 1982), hot spots policing (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995) and problem-orientated 
policing (Goldstein, 1990). 
 The standard model employs strategies that involve enforcing the law primarily in a 
reactive way. Strategies include increased number of police officers on the beat, the use of 
random motorized patrols to create a perception of police presence in public spaces, rapid 
response to calls for service intended to increase the likelihood of catching the offender, 
follow up investigations by detectives to enhance the chance of solving crimes, and arrest 
policies designed to deter and punish offenders as well as deter the general public from 
committing crimes. There is surprisingly limited research on the effectiveness of these 
strategies; however, the available evidence suggests that they tend to have limited effects on 
crime rates (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Sherman et al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).  
 Broken windows policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) represents a variant of the 
standard model. It is based on the theory that in communities where disorderly conduct and 
minor offenses (for example, public urination, fare skipping, shoplifting) go unchallenged, 
this sends a signal to offenders that crime is tolerated, which leads to a spiral of decline, 
which includes an increase in the severity of the offenses committed. Broken windows 
policing, which typically involves the strict and rapid arrest of those involved in minor 
offenses and disorder, is intended to reverse this process, sending a signal that crime will not 
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be tolerated, no matter how small. Despite its perceived success, results examining the 
effectiveness of this approach are mixed and a recent systematic review of the effects of 
disorder policing (Braga et al., 2015) found no overall effect of aggressive (broken windows) 
policing strategies on crime and disorder. Interestingly, the same review did find that 
alternative forms of disorder policing - namely community and problem oriented policing 
strategies - reduced crime. 
 These latter approaches differ from the standard model and broken windows policing 
in a number of important ways. The first approach explicitly involves the community in 
policing, while problem solving (Goldstein, 1990) involves efforts to identify and address 
recurring problems and working with those (actors or agencies) with the competency to 
address them (whoever they might be). In their review of policing interventions and their 
impact on crime, Weisburd and Eck (2004) provide a useful typology for conceptualising 
different strategies. Their typology uses two dimensions to differentiate between the level of 
focus of the strategy, and the diversity of the practices employed. Strategies that are applied 
uniformly across a city or offenders score low in terms of their level of focus, while those that 
are more focused, such as (geographically focused) hotspots policing score highly. Strategies 
that rely on police responses alone score low on the diversity dimension. In contrast, those 
that engage the community in a model of co-production, or engage in problem solving with a 
range of agencies to address environmental (or other) conditions that make crime more likely, 
would score high on the diversity dimension.  
 The standard and broken windows models of policing require little interaction with 
other agencies and are not geographically focused. As such, they are located in one corner of 
Weisburd and Eck’s (2004) policing typology. The FCANs model also occupies this 
quadrant, but importantly differs from these two approaches. Before articulating why more 
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explicitly, a brief discussion of economic theory is apposite since this underpins these 
approaches. 
 Becker’s (1968) rational choice theory of crime postulates that individuals engage in 
criminal behavior because the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. According to 
Becker, the optimal amount of enforcement is dependent on, among other things, the cost of 
catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishment (e.g. fines or prison terms), and 
the response of offenders to changes in enforcement. Becker demonstrated that: (1) optimal 
policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources; (2) some 
punishments incorporate non-monetary costs to society and to offenders; and (3) crime, and 
the control of crime, are choices that can be modelled using the standard labor economics 
model of individual decision-making regarding the allocation of time. In short, crime is 
simply another choice, akin to making a decision to work or invest in education. 
 Similar to Becker, Stigler (1970) states that: “…the commission of offences will be an 
act of production for income [such as theft and smuggling] or an act of consumption [for 
example speeding in a car for recreation or fun]” (p.529). Further, “…he [the offender] will 
recon the present value of the expected returns and costs of the criminal activity and compare 
their difference with the net returns from other criminal activities and from legitimate 
activities” (p.530). In short, according to both Becker and Stigler, the rational offender 
considers the benefit of the illegal act alongside the risk of apprehension, conviction and the 
severity of punishment. As such, offender decision making should be amenable to 
manipulation through changes (perceived or actual) in these latter factors. 
 As modelled by Ehrlich (1973), the expected utility from criminal activity is a 
function of: the probability of arrest (𝑃𝐴); the probability of conviction given arrest (𝑃𝐶|𝐴); 
the probability of imprisonment given conviction (𝑃𝐼|𝐶); and the average prison term (𝑆) if 
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imprisoned (the severity of punishment). In his review of the deterrence literature, Nagin 
(2013) concludes (like many others) that it is the certainty, rather than the severity of 
punishment that has the largest deterrent effect on offending. Because 𝑃𝐴 > 𝑃𝐶|𝐴 > 𝑃𝐼|𝐶, 
policies that target the probability of arrest and conviction are seen to be more effective in 
deterring criminal activity than policies focusing on the probability of imprisonment. As 
Nagin (2013) puts it “the conclusion that certainty not severity is the more effective deterrent 
is more precisely stated as certainty of apprehension and not the severity of the legal 
consequence ensuing from apprehension is the more effective deterrent” (p. 202). 
Considering the role of the police, Nagin (2013) suggests they fulfil at least two roles. The 
first is acting as sentinels whose presence is intended to deter crime. The second is acting as 
apprehension agents whose role is to catch offenders when deterrence fails (see Nagin, 
2013).  
 The use of FCANs is intended to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement in two 
ways. First, like broken windows policing, swift action on the part of the police is intended to 
increase offender perception of the certainty with which unlawful activity will be detected 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 have potential consequences (essentially 𝑃𝐴). However, unlike broken windows 
policing, by not involving a formal arrest, police encounters with alleged offenders are (also) 
swift and do not in and of themselves result in a legal penalty without due process. As a 
consequence, relative to the use of on the spot arrests (which themselves represent a penalty), 
the approach has the potential to improve public perception of police legitimacy and 
procedural justice (e.g. Tyler, 2014). This is an important goal in its own right, but research 
also suggests that those (citizens, victims and offenders) who perceive they have been treated 
fairly by the police are more likely to cooperate with them and comply with the law in the 
longer-term (for a review, see Skogan & Frydl, 2004). In this sense, the use of FCANs has 
the potential to improve public perception of police encounters than do other more aggressive 
9 
 
types of disorder policing. Second, the use of FCANs reduces the opportunity cost associated 
with the apprehension of offenders. This simultaneously increases the time the police have 
available to fulfill their role as sentinels, and where deterrence fails, the number of offenders 
they can proceed against, which has the potential to meaningfully influence offender 
perception of the risk of apprehension.  
 The aim of the current study is to test the impact of FCANs on crime. Specifically, we 
employ a quasi-experimental panel data design (drawing on a dataset of crime records 
collected in naturalistic settings) to uncover whether FCANs have a positive or negative 
effect on the rate of crime in the short- and long-term. 
DATA AND METHOD 
This study uses crime data provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (BOCSAR), and unemployment and population data provided by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS). BOCSAR data are provided for 153 Local Government Areas 
(LGAs), defined using 2006 boundaries, throughout NSW and Norfolk Island for the years 
1995 to 2013. The population mean (median) for the LGAs in the sample is 43,701 people 
(20,550). The mean (median) area of the LGAs in the sample is 5,171.62 km2 (2,692.68 km2). 
ABS data is for the Census years 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Twelve primary dependent variables representing rates of property crime are employed 
in our analysis. Each rate is the number of incidents reported to police in the LGA in that 
year, divided by the number of people in the LGA. In addition to an overall rate of property 
crime, the data are disaggregated according to the following sub categories of offenses: break 
and enter dwelling; break and enter non-dwelling; receiving or handling stolen goods; motor 
vehicle theft; theft from motor vehicle; theft from retail store; theft from a dwelling; theft 
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from person; stock theft; fraud; and other theft. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 
these variables. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
There are three independent variables: (1) Proceed FCAN – this is proportion of the 
total number of reported offenses (by category of offense) in the LGA for which an FCAN 
was used; (2) Narcotics – this is the number of persons of interest proceeded against by any 
means for possession and/or use of narcotics in the LGA per 1,000 persons in the LGA. This 
variable is included in the model in order to distinguish the impact of FCANs on offending 
rates from other potential confounders. This variable was used as evidence indicates that 
narcotic use is linked to the rise and fall in burglary and robbery in NSW (Donnelly, 
Weatherburn, & Chilvers, 2004; Moffatt, Weatherburn, & Donnelly, 2005); and (3) 
Unemployment – this is obtained from the ABS for the Census years 1996, 2001, 2006 and 
2011. Time periods in between the Census years are interpolated by incorporating 
information from national level movements in the unemployment rate. This variable is 
included in an effort to control for LGA specific time varying socio-economic characteristics 
that may confound the influence of FCANs on the rates of crime. 
THE MODEL 
To investigate the impact of FCANs (compared to other forms of proceeding against 
persons of interest) on rates of theft, similar to Wan, Moffatt, Jones, and Weatherburn (2012), 
we specify the following general dynamic panel data model: 
ln (crimek,t) = 𝜔 + ∑ αmln (crimek,t−m)
m
1 + β1ln (proceed_FCANk,t) +
β2ln (narcoticsk,t) + β3ln (unemploymentk,t) + κk + ∑ dtτt
t
1 + εk,t  
(1) 
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Where the dependent variable (ln (crimek,t))  is the natural log of the crime rate for a 
particular category of crime in LGA k, in year t. 𝜔 is a general constant. The explanatory 
variables are: ln (crimek,t−m) - the mth lag of the natural log of the crime rate, which is used 
to capture the dynamic nature of the process, in particular, how the effect of FCANs 
(compared to other forms of proceeding against persons of interest) is distributed over time; 
ln (proceed_FCANk,t) - the natural log of the rate of incidents proceeded against by way of an 
FCAN; ln (narcoticsk,t) - the natural log of the arrest rate for possession and/or use of 
narcotics; and ln (unemploymentk,t) - the natural log of the unemployment rate in the LGA. 
Finally, κk denotes LGA specific fixed effects,
1 which are used to abstract from the effects of 
time-stable unmeasured factors that vary across LGAs (or in econometric language, time-
invariant unobservable factors), dt is the coefficient for the dummy variables 1 through to t; 
τt denotes time (year) fixed effects and εk,t is the error term. Natural logs of all variables are 
used to address skewness. Conveniently, this transformation allows the coefficients to be 
interpreted as elasticities – that is, how responsive the crime rate is (estimated to be) to 
changes in the volume of FCANs per person of interest proceeded against. 
 Distinct from Kelaher and Sarafidis (2011) and Wan et al. (2012), in Equation 1 we 
do not partial out the specific probabilities of imprisonment and the average non-parole 
period. Hence, the coefficients of the FCAN variable should be interpreted in terms of the 
cumulative deterrent effects of proceeding against a person of interest by way of an FCAN, 
including the attendant effect of the probability of apprehension, conviction (these two are 
                                                 
1 The use of LGA-specific fixed effects differs in an important way from a hierarchical linear model with random 
intercepts or a random effects model in that it does not rely on the assumption that the explanatory variables are 
not correlated with LGA-specific component of the error term. If this assumption is violated this would bias the 
coefficient estimates. 
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arguably synonymous, with 92% of those charged with a criminal offence being convicted 
(Wan et al., 2012), imprisonment and sentence served. 
 In addition to LGA fixed effects, time fixed effects are also included in the model. 
The latter capture potential cross-sectional dependence (shocks common to all individuals at 
a point in time). The inclusion of time fixed effects is particularly important as the 
autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors, on which the 
dynamic panel data model crucially relies, assume no correlation across LGAs in the 
idiosyncratic disturbances. Time fixed effects make this assumption more likely to hold 
(Roodman, 2009). 
THE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
The estimation technique employed for the dynamic panel data model specified in 
Equation 1 is the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, specifically the first-differenced (as 
indicated by the ∆ symbol) twostep generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
depicted in Equation 2: 
∆ln (crimek,t) = ∑ αm∆ln (crimek,t−m)
m
1 + γ1∆ln (proceed_FCANk,t) +
γ2∆ln (narcoticsk,t) + γ3∆ln (unemploymentk,t) + ∑ dt∆τt
t
1 + ∆εk,t  
(2) 
Where all variables are defined as in Equation 1. Note, however, that the constant term 
(ω) is transformed out in first differenced-GMM. The implementation of this estimator is the 
ideal vehicle for testing causal claims about the criminal justice system on the property crime 
rate as it is possible to distinguish the temporal order of events. This technique ameliorates 
the problems that result from having endogenous explanatory variables. As noted by Wan et 
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al. (2012) this estimator mitigates the risk of omitted variables, simultaneity,2 ratio bias and it 
avoids full specification of the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity properties of the error.  
 It is also worth noting that while the twostep GMM estimator is more efficient than 
the onestep 2SLS estimator, the first-differenced GMM is more conservative than the system 
GMM.3 However, the standard errors are severely downwardly biased in finite samples. To 
remedy this, robust Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010; Roodman, 2009; Windmeijer, 2005). Moreover, orthogonal deviations (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995) and the small sample size correction (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011) are 
employed. A number of diagnostic checks and procedures are also used to ensure the 
appropriateness of the models estimated. 
DIAGNOSTIC CHECKS 
To begin, in Equation 2, all explanatory variables (except for the time fixed effects) are 
treated as endogenous or predetermined. Importantly, the Arellano-Bond estimator used in 
                                                 
2 Simultaneity bias arises from the construction of the dependent variable (ln (crimek,t)) and the explanatory 
variables (ln (crimek,t−m)) and (ln (proceed_FCANk,t)), where reported crimes feature in the numerator of the 
crime rate variables and the denominator of the FCAN variable. 
3 The first-difference GMM is more conservative as, unlike the system-GMM, it does not rely on the assumption 
that the first differences in the instrumenting variables are not correlated with the LGA-specific fixed effects 
(Roodman, 2009). For our study it is reasonable to expect, consistent with the 'Broken Windows' hypothesis 
(Wagers, Sousa, & Kelling, 2008), that a stable and higher than average level of crime in an area and associated 
stigmatisation may be related to past changes in the crime rate in that area. For this reason, there are strong 
theoretical grounds for employing the first-differenced GMM rather than the system-GMM. Also, ratio bias might 
arise due to measurement error owing to a systematic bias in how crimes and arrests are reported to, and recorded 
by, law enforcement agencies. In two key respects the use of the first-differenced twostep GMM estimator 
addresses these concerns. First, where these sources of measurement error are time-invariant they are abstracted 
from through first-differencing. Second, where these sources of measurement error are non-random and time 
varying, the use of valid instruments makes consistent estimation possible (Bond, Hoeffler, & Temple, 2001). 
Moreover, the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction criteria provides assurance that the results are not 
confounded by measurement error even where the measurement error may be decidedly non-random. 
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this study employs ‘internal’ instruments for the endogenous variables. These instruments are 
lags of the independent variables.4 For example, the ln(crimekt−1) variable in column 1 of 
Table 3a is instrumented using its own lags, specifically, the 1st order lag, the 2nd order lag 
and the 3rd order lag. The Hansen test of overriding restrictions is used to test whether or not 
the instruments themselves are endogenous. In addition to this test of the exclusion 
restriction, consistent estimation of the Arellano-Bond estimator also requires that the error 
term be serially uncorrelated. This assumption and requirement is testable using the Arellano-
Bond test which tests the null hypothesis that there is no correlation: 
- Between the first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆εk,t) and the first differenced 
error in t-1 (∆εk,t−1) (as indicated by AR(1)); 
- Between first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆εk,t) and the first differenced 
error in t-2 (∆εk,t−2) (as indicated by AR(2)); and 
- Between the first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆εk,t) and the first differenced 
error in t-3 (∆εk,t−3) (as indicated by AR(3)). 
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000 
AR(2) Prob > z = 0.9240 
AR(3) Prob > z = 0.6310 
Note, we expect to reject the null hypothesis at the first order AR(1) 
as:𝐶𝑜𝑣(∆εk,t, ∆εk,t−1) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(εk,t − εk,t−1, εk,t−1 − εk,t−2) =  − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(εk,t − εk,t−1, εk,t−1 −
                                                 
4 An instrumental variable (IV) is an exogenous variable correlated with an endogenous explanatory (or 
independent) variable, although not correlated with the dependent variable except through the IV’s correlation 
with the endogenous explanatory variable. An IV is used to estimate causal relationships where the explanatory 
variables are correlated with the error term. Importantly, there are two main requirements for using an IV. First, 
the IV must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable(s). Second, the IV cannot be correlated with 
the error term in the explanatory equation. In both instances this is conditional on the other covariates. 
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εk,t−2) ≠ 0. But we do not expect it to be rejected at higher orders (∆εk,t will not be 
correlated with ∆εk,t−s for 𝑠 ≥ 2). The results in column 1 of Table 3a indicate that there is 
no serial correlation in the original error ∆εk,t, as desired. In the estimated models, the 
number of autoregressive terms or lags was determined by statistical significance, the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors and 
satisfaction of the exclusion restriction. 
 A potential pitfall associated with the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator is the 
problem of instrument proliferation. That is, the Arellano-Bond estimator may generate many 
internal instruments. For example, where the ln(proceed_FCANk,t) variable is instrumented 
using its own lags (specifically, the (ln (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑘,𝑡−1) (1
st order lag), 
(ln (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑘,𝑡−2) (2
nd order lag) and (ln (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑘,𝑡−3) (3
rd order lag). In t = 
3 only the first two of these are available. In t = 4, 5 and 6 all three are available yielding a 
total of 2 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 11 instruments over t = 4 to t = 6 alone and for the FCAN variable 
alone. Each instrumenting variable generates one column for each time period and lag 
available to that time period making the number of instruments quadratic in T. In order to 
address this proliferation of instruments, the instruments may be ‘collapsed’. This stacks 
these instruments in long form. For example, 
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 ⋯
𝑦𝑖1 0 0 0 0 0 ⋯
0 𝑦𝑖2 𝑦𝑖1 0 0 0 ⋯
0 0 0 𝑦𝑖3 𝑦𝑖2 𝑦𝑖1 ⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ]
 
 
 
 
 or, collapsed 
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 ⋯
𝑦𝑖1 0 0 ⋯
𝑦𝑖2 𝑦𝑖1 0 ⋯
𝑦𝑖3 𝑦𝑖2 𝑦𝑖1 ⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱]
 
 
 
 
 
In doing so, we are able to guard against instrument proliferation that would otherwise 
weaken the Hansen test (for example, you could get implausibly good p values of 1.0000), 
which, while robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, is not robust to instrument 
proliferation. The use of too many instruments would fail to expunge the endogeneity through 
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overfitting. For intuition, consider that 2SLS, if the number of instruments equals the number 
of observations, the R2 of the first-stage regressions are 1 and the second-stage results match 
those of (biased) OLS. The use of the collapse option helps to address this problem 
(Roodman, 2009). For example, in column 1 of Table 3a (discussed in full later) without 
collapsing the instruments 221 are generated. In contrast when the instruments are collapsed 
the instrument count is only 29. 
 Additional measures were taken to interrogate the appropriateness of the model. 
Specifically, a simple least squares dummy variable estimation confirmed that the LGA fixed 
effects are jointly statistically significant. Further, Wooldridge’s (2010) test for serial 
correlation provided evidence of first-order autocorrelation in all categories of offending. 
This result demonstrates the dynamic nature of the data. Moreover, Im, Pesaran and Shin’s 
(2003) test for unit roots in panel data, after abstracting from cross-sectional dependence 
(removing cross-sectional means), indicates that all dependent variables are stationary. These 
findings attest to the appropriateness of using the first-differenced twostep GMM estimator. 
 As a final check regarding the plausibility of the lag term coefficient estimates, these 
estimates are compared with those obtained using a pooled OLS model and a traditional fixed 
effects model. These terms describe the speed with which impacts are distributed over time, 
where smaller coefficients and lower order lags indicate a more rapid change, and larger 
coefficients and higher order lags indicate a more gradual change, over time. The lag term 
estimates should be between the pooled OLS model (the upper bound, as the estimates are 
biased upwards) and the traditional fixed effects model (the lower bound, as the estimates are 
biased downwards). All the models are within the bounds. 
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SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN IMPACTS OF FCANS 
Results for rates of crime are presented with respect to their short- and long-run effects. 
The short-run effect refers to changes that occur in a given period (in this study, each year). 
The long-run effect, also known as the total or asymptotic effect, encompasses the entire 
distributive process; it includes (in addition to the short-run effect) the impact of the variables 
in previous periods through the lag term(s). 
 A priori, it is expected that the lag terms, individually, will be less than unity although 
greater than zero and sum to less than one to ensure stationarity. After holding other factors 
constant, the short-run effects (the coefficients) γ1 may be expected to be positive if greater 
use of FCANs encourages offending (or conversely other means of proceeding against 
discourages offending). It is possible that being issued a FCAN, rather than being proceeded 
against by other means, may provide less of a deterrent. This is quite plausible for more 
violent offenses. For example, Kelaher and Sarafidis (2011) find that violent offenders are 
more persistent and resistant to deterrence. It may also be the case, however, that for 
relatively minor offences or economically motivated crimes, the use of FCANs enables law 
enforcement officers to increase capture rates, thus creating a larger deterrent effect, ceteris 
paribus. This would translate to a negative coefficient for γ1. With regards to the other 
determinants of the crime rate, the coefficients γ2 and γ3 are expected to be positive.  
 The short-term effects illustrated by the coefficient estimates γ1 through to γ3 only 
point to a fraction of the asymptotic effect that is distributed over time. 
In order to estimate the total long-run effect on the crime rate, Equation 3 is employed: 
∆crimek,t =
γj
1−∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑚
1
,               j = 1,...,4               m = 1,...,2 (3) 
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Where the sum of the lag term(s) (αm) is less than one and greater than zero within the 
bounds of stationarity. The magnitude of this coefficient determines the degree to which the 
effect of FCANs is distributed over the short- compared to the long-run. The long-run 
cumulative effect can be expected to be greater than the short-run effect. 
RESULTS 
A simple examination of the pairwise contemporaneous correlations are illustrated in 
Table 2. Results show that in some cases the correlation between variables is relatively high. 
The highest correlations are 0.5724 (for motor vehicle theft, between ln(narcotics) and 
ln(crime)), 0.3982 (for steal from person, between ln(narcotics) and ln(crime)) and 0.3978 
(for stealing, between ln(narcotics) and ln(crime)). They are all at the upper bounds of an 
acceptable level, nonetheless we feel that correlations between variables have not adversely 
affected results and we are, therefore, confident in the estimates presented in the following 
sections.5 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
                                                 
5 Variance inflation factors were also investigated. This is a significant hurdle for models which include lag(s) of 
the dependent variable. All models except the ‘Motor vehicle theft’ model have variance inflation factors that are 
less than the rule of thumb of 10. For this model the highest variance inflation factor is found for the second order 
lag of ‘Motor vehicle theft’, which is marginally higher than 10 at 11.1900. O’Brien (2007) shows that even 
variance inflation factors well over 10 are not necessarily a serious problem. Multicollinearity does not bias 
coefficient or standard error estimates, it simply increases standard errors relative to instances with low 
collinearity. Larger standard errors, of course, make it harder to reject the null hypothesis and can explain null 
findings. Nonetheless, it does not appear that our models are especially affected by multicollinearity. The 
magnitude, signs and levels of statistical significance for the short-term effect do not change greatly for the 
omission of this lag term. This likely reflects the fact that the variance inflation factor only marginally exceeds 
the conventional limit. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Tables 3 (a and b) and 4 (a and b) we report the short-run and long-run results for 
rates of property crime.6 We reiterate that the impact of the FCAN variable is interpreted as 
the impact of the use of FCANs to proceed against persons of interest as either reducing or 
increasing the crime rates through deterrence (or lack thereof), compared to other means of 
proceeding. 
INSERT TABLE 3a and 3b HERE 
OFFENCE RATES IN THE SHORT-RUN 
Tables 3a and 3b provide an abridged summary of short-run model results for rates of 
overall property crime and the 11 sub-categories of offending considered. Full results are 
presented as Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. As indicated in Table 3a (column 1), we did 
not find a statistically significant association between the use of FCANs and overall property 
offences at the 5% level (p-value of 0.0760). In terms of the distributed process itself, it is 
best described by a first order, second order and fourth order lag. These coefficient estimates 
are stationary and are not statistically significantly different from equivalent pooled ordinary 
least squares estimates (which are biased upwards) and greater than similar fixed effects 
                                                 
6 The reader should note that crime categories 9 (Steal from person) and 10 (Stock theft) contain a number of 
zeros, which before being logged are linearly transformed by adding a constant of 1 (a typical approach 
employed to deal with zero values in this context). Results for these categories therefore have the potential to be 
biased with the strength of the relationship between the use of FCANs and crime rates in these categories being 
understated. All other categories do not have this problem. One way of addressing this is to take the square root 
of the variable. However, this requires the reader to use the chain rule to interpret the results – this is complex 
and not widely understood, making interpretation of the results more difficult. The use of natural log allows a 
more straightforward interpretation of the results and permits the estimation of a flexible functional form. For 
completeness, we analyzed the data using a square root transformation (results available upon request) but as the 
results did not differ materially (but are harder to interpret) to those reported we discuss them no further. 
20 
 
estimates (which are biased downwards). The lag terms of all subsequent regression estimates 
fall neatly within the bounds suggested by these models.  
 In regards to sub-categories 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, the results indicate that a 1% increase in 
the use of FCANs reduces offenses by between 0.05% (sub-category 7) and 14.72% (sub-
category 6). No statistically significant relationship could be found between the use of 
FCANs and offense rates for offense sub-categories 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The coefficient 
estimates are stationary, and the lag term coefficient estimates fall within the bounds of 
equivalent pooled ordinary least squares estimates and fixed effects estimates. 
In regards to the effect of the arrest rate for the possession and use of narcotics, a strong 
positive association is found between this variable and stealing sub-categories 4, 7 and 11. In 
regards to the rate of unemployment, a positive association is found between this variable and 
stealing sub-categories 5 and 7. 
 Our F-test results suggest that all models are jointly statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the Arellano and Bond test provides no evidence of autocorrelation at AR(2) and 
AR(3). Further, the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions is not rejected in any model. 
Not rejecting the Hansen test of overriding restrictions is important. It means that the 
instruments themselves are not endogenous (they are exogenous). That is, they do not explain 
the dependent variable except through the independent variables that they are instrumenting. 
THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF FCANS ON OFFENSE RATES 
Tables 4a and 4b provide long-run model results. Table 4a (column 1) suggests that the 
use of FCANs does not deter property offenses in the aggregate. However, in the long-run, as 
illustrated in Tables 4a and 4b, the use of FCANs has a statistically significant negative long-
run effect on the rates of offenses for sub-categories 5, 7 and 8. No significant relationship is 
found for the other sub-categories. 
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INSERT TABLE 4a and 4b HERE 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to estimate the impact of FCANs on overall rates of property 
offenses and for 11 specific types of offenses. In both the short- and long-run, at the 5% level 
we find no statistically significant effect between the use of FCANs and the overall level of 
property offenses. Considering the sub-categories of offenses, in the short-run, with the 
exception of the offense receiving stolen goods, the directions of the estimated coefficients 
are consistent with the idea that FCANs have a deterrent effect on specific types of crime. 
These effects are statistically significant for five of the 11 sub-categories of offenses (break 
and enter dwelling; motor vehicle theft; steal from motor vehicle; steal from retail store and; 
steal from dwelling). Setting statistical significance aside for one moment, one reason for the 
anomalous finding for the offense receiving stolen goods is perhaps that, unlike the other 
offenses, this is not a direct contact crime, and offenders may perceive the likelihood of 
detection as lower for this than for other types of offenses.  
 The long-run results are largely consistent with the short-run results. That is, in the 
long-run, our results show that an increase in the use of FCANs leads to statistically 
significant decreases in the rate of crime for the following sub-categories of offenses: motor 
vehicle theft; steal from retail store; and steal from dwelling.  
 The empirical analysis presented above thus suggests that for some categories of 
offenses, the use of FCANs may be an effective and potentially efficient policing strategy in 
that, compared to alternative approaches of proceeding, offenders can be processed at lower 
cost and long-run rates of crime reduced. However, it would appear that the effects are 
specific rather than generalized, since the effects were observed only for some forms of 
crime, both in the short- and long-term, and overall property crime did not appear to be 
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affected. Thus, contrary to the ideas that underpin Broken Windows policing, the use of 
FCANs did not appear to have a general deterrent effect on property crime. If replicated 
elsewhere, this finding suggests that rather than being applied universally across crime types, 
the use of FCANs should be targeted to address specific types of crime. While it was not 
possible to do this in the current study, unpicking why FCANs appear to impact upon some 
forms of (minor) crime but not others would seem to be a useful next step.  
 Continuing with the theme of specificity, as noted in the introduction, in NSW 
FCANs are applied uniformly across geographic locations. The absence of a geographic 
focus to this strategy contrasts with contemporary initiatives in the U.S. and other countries 
where hotspots policing is currently enjoying popularity (e.g. Braga et al., 2015). The aim of 
hotspots policing is to direct resources to those locations where the likelihood of crime is 
highest. As such, the targeting strategy is intended to increase the frequency with which 
police officers will be present during the commission of a crime (or better still) before it 
occurs, increasing the likelihood that they will detect or (more likely) deter it. In this way, the 
targeting strategy can be seen to increase the dosage of police officer presence at locations 
where crime is most likely. The use of FCANs also effectively influences dosage. That is, 
through their swift administration (relative to arrests) FCANs increase the amount of time 
that police officers are available to act as sentinels or guardians against crime. An obvious 
evolution that might be tested in future research would be to combine the use of FCANs and 
a hotspots policing strategy.  
 A further issue discussed in the introduction concerned procedural justice and police 
legitimacy. We noted that, relative to more aggressive disorder policing strategies, the 
process through which FCANs are issued may well increase public - and indeed offender (see 
Skogan & Frydl, 2004) - perceptions of police legitimacy, and as a consequence influence 
their compliance with the law. It was beyond the scope of the current study to examine this 
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issue here, but future research might examine (for example) public perceptions of police 
legitimacy for encounters that involve the issuance of FCANs as opposed to those that 
involve the arrest of offenders (for similar offenses). 
 This study is of course not without limitations. Chief amongst these is that the data 
analyzed are recorded crime data that are reported to and recorded by the police. It is well 
documented that much crime goes unreported and so the reader should consider this when 
interpreting the results reported here. However, we can see no obvious reason for why this 
should affect the results reported, as the model specification was designed to address such 
issues.  
 An additional caveat to consider when interpreting these results is that at an individual 
level, it is plausible that there is some self-selection in terms of police officers' decisions 
regarding the use of FCANs versus other means of proceeding against persons of interest. For 
example, it is possible that police officers are more likely to issue FCANs to individuals who 
are less likely to re-offend or conversely less likely to issue FCANs to individuals who are 
more likely to re-offend. This decision is a result of their understanding of individuals of 
interest who reside or operate within their local area command. Such self-selection would 
exaggerate the deterrent effect. This is difficult to test using a quasi-experimental design, but 
future studies might do so using a randomized control trial intended to detect direct effects of 
the intervention and any diffusion of benefits that might arise. 
 This study is unique in that it provides empirical evidence regarding the use of a 
policing process intended to more efficiently process offenders for relatively minor crimes 
(specifically, property offenses). For approximately 20 years FCANs have been used by 
NSW police, however, the effectiveness of this has not previously been investigated. The 
findings reported here thus have important implications for police management who are held 
to account both in regards to the strategies employed to protect or enhance community safety 
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but also the effectiveness of these strategies in terms of reductions in the overall rate of 
crime. Our findings suggest that for some crimes the effects of the approach are observable in 
the short-term but are also persistent. The approach thus represents a promising one that 
might be added to the police toolbox in countries other than Australia. 
 Future research may benefit from investigating the potentially time varying 
heterogeneity of the autoregressive terms. It may be the case that the distributed impacts of 
the use of FCANs differ over time, and may potentially reveal some interesting and useful 
insights in terms of the dynamic nature of the process. In our study we controlled for and 
abstracted from spatial/geographic/locational heterogeneity, specifically, differences between 
local government areas. By treating spatial/geographic/locational heterogeneity as a nuisance 
term, this study provides estimates independent of such contextual factors. However, this 
research might be extended further by exploring how the effectiveness of policing policies 
may depend on different spatial/geographic/locational characteristics. For instance, it may be 
the case that FCANs are more or less effective in areas of high/low informal surveillance. 
Further work may also explore the extent to which the apparent effects of the use of FCANs 
are due to the police being able to process offenders more quickly (i.e. their role as 
apprehension agents), or to their opportunity to act as sentinels whose presence deters crime. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for crime rates (per 100,000 population) and FCANs issued as a 
proportion of the total number of reported incidents or persons of interest proceeded against as 
defined in the crime rate (by category of offence) in the LGA7,8 
Variable name Observations Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Min Max 
Crime rates     
Stealing 2926 0.0264 
(0.0182) 
0.0000 0.2941 
Break and enter dwelling 2926 0.0077 
(0.0056) 
0.0000 0.0527 
Break and enter non-dwelling 2926 0.0058 
(0.0045) 
0.0000 0.0480 
Receiving or handling stolen 
goods 
2926 0.0010 
(0.0012) 
0.0000 0.0199 
Motor vehicle theft 2926 0.0036 
(0.0035) 
0.0000 0.0360 
Steal from motor vehicle 2926 0.0075 
(0.0063) 
0.0000 0.0943 
Steal from retail store 2926 0.0023 
(0.0020) 
0.0000 0.0204 
Steal from dwelling 2926 0.0044 
(0.0023) 
0.0000 0.0226 
Steal from person 2926 0.0010 
(0.0026) 
0.0000 0.0530 
Stock theft 2926 0.0005 
(0.0007) 
0.0000 0.0066 
Fraud 2926 0.0037 
(0.0032) 
0.0000 0.0503 
Other theft 2926 0.0072 
(0.0064) 
0.0000 0.1111 
Proceed_FCAN     
Stealing 2926 0.0152 
(0.0207) 
0.0000 0.4070 
Break and enter dwelling 2907 0.0014 
(0.0072) 
0.0000 0.1111 
Break and enter non-dwelling 2911 0.0016 
(0.0103) 
0.0000 0.2500 
Receiving or handling stolen 
goods 
2712 0.0798 
(0.1444) 
0.0000 2.0000 
                                                 
7 The proceed_FCAN has a maximum outside the expected limit of one because reported incidents do not equate 
exactly with offences. For example, one incident may involve two offenders (New South Wales Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2014). 
8 Where the minimum value is zero, the variables were linearly transformed (adding one) in order to preserve 
the relative ordering of the observations and permit the natural log transformation. 
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Motor vehicle theft 2879 0.0062 
(0.0352) 
0.0000 1.0000 
Steal from motor vehicle 2906 0.0030 
(0.0232) 
0.0000 1.0000 
Steal from retail store 2771 0.1238 
(0.2028) 
0.0000 3.5000 
Steal from dwelling 2909 0.0036 
(0.0164) 
0.0000 0.5000 
Steal from person 2453 0.0057 
(0.0508) 
0.0000 1.0000 
Stock theft 2411 0.0027 
(0.0332) 
0.0000 1.0000 
Fraud 2893 0.0230 
(0.1257) 
0.0000 5.3333 
Other theft 2917 0.0093 
(0.0186) 
0.0000 0.3846 
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Table 2: Contemporaneous correlations 
 ln(crime) ln(proceed_FCAN) ln(narcotics) ln(unemployment) 
Stealing     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0304 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3978 0.0610 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.1346 0.1361 0.2651 1.0000 
Break and enter 
dwelling 1.0000    
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0205 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3326 -0.0070 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.2987 0.0559 0.2818 1.0000 
Break and enter non-
dwelling     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) 0.0217 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.1425 0.0074 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.3363 0.0531 0.2817 1.0000 
Receiving or handling 
stolen goods     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0284 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3676 -0.0126 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.1878 -0.0168 0.2748 1.0000 
Motor vehicle theft     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0795 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.5724 -0.0475 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.1923 0.0299 0.2809 1.0000 
Steal from motor vehicle     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0568 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.4330 -0.0050 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.1035 0.0303 0.2821 1.0000 
Steal from retail store     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.1375 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3645 0.0398 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.1788 0.0136 0.2734 1.0000 
Steal from dwelling     
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ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) 0.0171 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.0393 -0.0001 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.3313 0.0800 0.2824 1.0000 
Steal from person     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0276 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3982 -0.0216 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) -0.0108 0.0365 0.2646 1.0000 
Stock theft     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0048 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) -0.2493 -0.0057 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) -0.1716 0.0046 0.2994 1.0000 
Fraud     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0720 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.2913 -0.0264 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) -0.0341 0.0886 0.2795 1.0000 
Other theft     
ln(crime) 1.0000    
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0341 1.0000   
ln(narcotics) 0.3255 0.0208 1.0000  
ln(unemployment) 0.0463 0.0292 0.2819 1.0000 
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Table 3a: Short-run model results (offences - stealing categories 1-6) 
 (1) 
Stealing 
 
 
ln(crime) 
(2) 
Break and 
enter 
dwelling 
 
ln(crime) 
(3) 
Break 
and enter 
non-
dwelling 
 
ln(crime) 
(4) 
Receiving/ 
handling 
stolen 
goods 
ln(crime) 
(5) 
Motor 
vehicle 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
(6) 
Steal 
from 
motor 
vehicle 
ln(crime) 
ln(crime) (lag 1) 0.6350*** 
(0.0496) 
0.5875*** 
(0.0424) 
0.4327*** 
(0.0562) 
0.4629*** 
(0.1074) 
0.5797*** 
(0.0299) 
0.4964*** 
(0.0963) 
ln(crime) (lag 2) 0.1699*** 
(0.0316) 
0.2242*** 
(0.0346) 
0.2416*** 
(0.0546) 
 0.1454*** 
(0.0300) 
0.1535*** 
(0.0444) 
ln(crime) (lag 3)   0.0663 
(0.0356) 
 0.1639*** 
(0.0263) 
0.0905** 
(0.0365) 
ln(crime) (lag 4) 0.0975*** 
(0.0297) 
     
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0144 
(0.0080) 
-0.1135** 
(0.0570) 
-0.0597 
(0.0338) 
0.0008 
(0.0015) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1472** 
(0.0639) 
ln(narcotics) 0.0024 
(0.0015) 
0.0015 
(0.0019) 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0025 
(0.0023) 
ln(unemployment) -0.0006 
(0.0014) 
-0.0000 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0000 
(0.0014) 
Observations 2156 2446 2297 2415 2269 2293 
Groups 154 154 154 153 154 154 
F-statistics F(20, 154) 
= 273.1900 
F(21,154)= 
163.2300 
F(21, 154) 
= 
156.8800 
F(21, 153) 
= 43.7000 
F(21, 
154) = 
239.8900 
F(21, 
154) = 
42.6100 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 1)) 
[1, 3] [1,2] [1, 2] [1, 1] [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 2)) 
 [1,2] [1, 2]  [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 3)) 
  [1, 2]  [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits (other)  [2, 6] [2, 2] [2, 3] [1, 2] [2, 6] 
Instrument count 29 34 22 24 24 34 
Arellano-Bond tests      
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0380 
AR(2) Prob > z = 0.9240 0.5180 0.4360 0.1780 0.6800 0.5900 
AR(3) Prob > z = 0.6310 0.9430 0.5430 0.4580 0.8750 0.7790 
Hansen test Prob > 
𝜒2 = 
0.6170 0.6310 0.5440 0.5950 0.8410 0.5560 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3b: Short-run model results (offences - stealing categories 7-12) 
 (7) 
Steal 
from 
retail 
store 
ln(crime) 
(8) 
Steal 
from 
dwelling 
ln(crime) 
(9) 
Steal from 
person 
 
ln(crime) 
(10) 
Stock 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
(11) 
Fraud 
 
ln(crime) 
(12) 
Other 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
ln(crime) (lag 1) 0.4183*** 
(0.0538) 
0.4647*** 
(0.0320) 
0.9128** 
(0.3767) 
0.1663** 
(0.0769) 
0.4019** 
(0.1590) 
0.8538*** 
(0.0927) 
ln(crime) (lag 2)  0.2455*** 
(0.0338) 
  0.2127 
(0.1155) 
 
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0028** 
(0.0013) 
-0.1705 
(1.0679) 
-0.0071 
(0.0089) 
-0.0010 
(0.0007) 
-0.1340 
(0.2270) 
ln(narcotics) 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0049 
(0.0321) 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0013 
(0.0032) 
ln(unemployment) 0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0075) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0009 
(0.0010) 
0.0040 
(0.0064) 
Observations 2470 2450 2165 2121 2587 2610 
Groups 152 154 151 150 154 154 
F-statistics F(21, 
152) = 
14.0200 
F(21, 
154) = 
92.4900 
F(21, 151) 
= 14.0100 
F(21, 
150) = 
4.5000 
F(20, 
154) = 
7.3800 
F(21, 
154) = 
33.7800 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 1)) 
[1, 3] [1, 1] [6, 7] [1, 1] [2, 2] [5, 6] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 2)) 
 [1, 1]     
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 3)) 
    [2, 5]  
Lag limits (other) [1, 3] [1, 4] [6, 6] [2, 4] [1, 2] [2, 3] 
Instrument count 29 30 22 27 26 25 
Arellano-Bond tests       
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000 0.0000 0.8700 0.0000 0.0000 0.2510 
AR(2) Prob > z = 0.9700 0.1310 0.8770 0.8590 0.0790 0.4020 
AR(3) Prob > z = 0.1000 0.9310 0.7240 0.1520 0.4550 0.8360 
Hansen test Prob > 
𝜒2 = 
0.2550 0.9570 0.4700 0.4340 0.3890 0.8550 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4a: Long-run model results (offences - stealing categories 1-6) 
 (1) 
Stealing 
 
 
ln(crime) 
(2) 
Break 
and 
enter 
dwelling 
 
ln(crime) 
(3) 
Break and 
enter non-
dwelling 
 
ln(crime) 
(4) 
Receiving/ 
handling 
stolen goods 
ln(crime) 
(5) 
Motor 
vehicle 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
(6) 
Steal 
from 
motor 
vehicle 
ln(crime) 
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.1478 
(0.0975) 
-0.6027 
(0.4035) 
-0.2303 
(0.1387) 
0.0014 
(0.0028) 
-0.0139** 
(0.0057) 
-0.5670 
(0.3411) 
ln(narcotics) 0.0244 
(0.0196) 
0.0080 
(0.0084) 
0.0049 
(0.0058) 
0.0046** 
(0.0018) 
0.0035 
(0.0034) 
0.0096 
(0.0087) 
ln(unemployment) -0.0057 
(0.0135) 
-0.0000 
(0.0062) 
0.0035 
(0.0035) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0093 
(0.0057) 
-0.0002 
(0.0053) 
Delta method standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4b: Long-run model results (offences - stealing categories 7-12) 
 (7) 
Steal from 
retail store 
ln(crime) 
(8) 
Steal from 
dwelling 
ln(crime) 
(9) 
Steal 
from 
person 
 
ln(crime) 
(10) 
Stock 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
(11) 
Fraud 
 
ln(crime) 
(12) 
Other 
theft 
 
ln(crime) 
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0097** 
(0.0047) 
-1.9557 
(7.4796) 
-0.0085 
(0.0107) 
-0.0026 
(0.0024) 
-0.9165 
(1.3727) 
ln(narcotics) 0.0011** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
-0.0568 
(0.2985) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0024 
(0.0016) 
-0.0090 
(0.0233) 
ln(unemployment) 0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
0.0016 
(0.0012) 
0.0102 
(0.1012) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0045** 
(0.0020) 
0.0272 
(0.0435) 
Delta method standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A1: Frequency of the use of FCANs (1995-2013) – all offense categories 
Year Offense category 
 Against justice 
procedures 
Assault Disorderly 
conduct 
Drug 
offences 
Malicious 
damage to 
property 
Stealing 
1995 0 2 0 0 1 3 
1996 1 16 0 0 3 15 
1997 25 123 72 30 83 363 
1998 405 1359 2780 1345 977 3027 
1999 983 2411 6134 3542 1676 5709 
2000 827 2317 4681 3240 1637 5747 
2001 673 1993 3128 2997 1457 4824 
2002 602 1464 2618 2230 1225 4574 
2003 580 1288 2179 2457 1178 4408 
2004 654 1412 2327 2691 1219 3895 
2005 791 1294 2668 2706 1240 3630 
2006 795 1235 2404 2853 1153 3575 
2007 704 1248 2403 3066 1200 3635 
2008 714 1041 1401 3767 1085 2435 
2009 724 903 1350 4979 957 2546 
2010 546 848 985 5006 832 2229 
2011 590 883 983 5689 837 2364 
2012 528 809 910 6826 765 2589 
2013 508 931 941 6859 737 2437 
Source: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
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Table A2: Frequency of the use of FCANs (1995-2013) – stealing sub-categories 
Year Offense category     
 Break 
and 
enter 
dwelling 
Break 
and 
enter 
non-
dwelling 
Receiving 
or 
handling 
stolen 
goods 
Motor 
vehicle 
theft 
Steal 
from 
motor 
vehicle 
Steal 
from 
retail 
store 
Steal 
from 
dwelling 
Steal 
from 
person 
Stock 
theft 
Fraud Other 
theft 
1995 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
1996 6 2 8 4 1 2 3 0 0 6 3 
1997 10 12 59 14 11 205 12 2 0 107 26 
1998 71 69 620 96 141 1833 156 21 6 457 413 
1999 115 138 1258 162 208 3668 222 46 12 678 875 
2000 102 108 1367 206 194 3720 182 32 2 720 897 
2001 62 64 966 127 144 3417 159 22 1 478 603 
2002 35 50 721 87 82 3383 92 27 0 535 455 
2003 36 39 690 78 88 3390 100 29 5 376 420 
2004 28 28 613 44 72 2973 83 11 0 331 425 
2005 26 23 510 63 111 2572 71 23 0 407 446 
2006 26 21 527 42 64 2655 71 18 1 347 419 
2007 40 25 503 30 58 2762 45 21 2 329 418 
2008 24 24 363 42 53 1781 44 20 3 252 282 
2009 30 21 370 37 55 1972 47 10 2 156 305 
2010 12 14 419 26 43 1669 40 15 0 176 286 
2011 17 14 512 32 36 1734 40 15 2 245 293 
2012 10 16 665 33 50 1972 43 34 0 229 267 
2013 15 16 724 30 33 1795 38 28 0 259 294 
Source: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
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Table B1: Full short-run model results (offences - stealing sub-categories 1-6) 
 (1) 
Stealing 
offences 
ln(crime) 
(2) 
Break and 
enter 
dwelling 
 
ln(crime) 
(3) 
Break 
and enter 
non-
dwelling 
ln(crime) 
(4) 
Receiving/ 
handling 
stolen 
goods 
ln(crime) 
(5) 
Motor 
vehicle 
theft 
ln(crime) 
(6) 
Steal 
from 
motor 
vehicle 
ln(crime) 
ln(crime) (lag 1) 0.6350*** 
(0.0496) 
0.5875*** 
(0.0424) 
0.4327*** 
(0.0562) 
0.4629*** 
(0.1074) 
0.5797*** 
(0.0299) 
0.4964*** 
(0.0963) 
ln(crime) (lag 2) 0.1699*** 
(0.0316) 
0.2242*** 
(0.0346) 
0.2416*** 
(0.0546) 
 0.1454*** 
(0.0300) 
0.1535*** 
(0.0444) 
ln(crime) (lag 3) 0.0975*** 
(0.0297) 
 0.0663 
(0.0356) 
 0.1639*** 
(0.0263) 
0.0905** 
(0.0365) 
ln(proceed_FCAN) -0.0144 
(0.0080) 
-0.1135** 
(0.0570) 
-0.0597 
(0.0338) 
0.0008 
(0.0015) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0006) 
-0.1472** 
(0.0639) 
ln(narcotics) 0.0024 
(0.0015) 
0.0015 
(0.0019) 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0025 
(0.0023) 
ln(unemployment) -0.0006 
(0.0014) 
-0.0000 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0000 
(0.0014) 
_year1997    0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
  
_year1998  0.0006 
(0.0004) 
 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
  
_year1999  -0.0011 
(0.0006) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
_year2000 0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0007) 
_year2001 -0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
_year2002 -0.0027*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0007) 
_year2003 -0.0035*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
_year2004 -0.0047*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.0006) 
_year2005 -0.0043*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
_year2006 -0.0032*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0007) 
_year2007 -0.0031*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
_year2008 -0.0029*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0007) 
_year2009 -0.0036*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0007) 
_year2010 -0.0024*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0008) 
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_year2011 -0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
_year2012 -0.0024*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0007) 
_year2013 -0.0027*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0007) 
Observations 2156 2446 2297 2415 2269 2293 
Groups 154 154 154 153 154 154 
F-statistics F(20, 
154) = 
273.1900 
F(21,154)= 
163.2300 
F(21, 154) 
= 
156.8800 
F(21, 153) 
= 43.7000 
F(21, 
154) = 
239.8900 
F(21, 
154) = 
42.6100 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 1)) 
[1, 3] [1,2] [1, 2] [1, 1] [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 2)) 
29 [1,2] [1, 2]  [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 3)) 
  [1, 2]  [1, 1] [1, 2] 
Lag limits (other)  [2, 6] [2, 2] [2, 3] [1, 2] [2, 6] 
Instrument count  34 22 24 24 34 
Arellano-Bond 
tests 
      
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0380 
AR(2) Prob > z = 0.9240 0.5180 0.4360 0.1780 0.6800 0.5900 
AR(3) Prob > z = 0.6310 0.9430 0.5430 0.4580 0.8750 0.7790 
Hansen test Prob > 
𝜒2 = 
0.6170 0.6310 0.5440 0.5950 0.8410 0.5560 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B2: Full short-run model results (offences - stealing sub-categories 7-12) 
 (7) 
Steal 
from 
retail 
store 
ln(crime) 
(8) 
Steal 
from 
dwelling 
ln(crime) 
(9) 
Steal 
from 
person 
ln(crime) 
(10) 
Stock 
theft 
ln(crime) 
(11) 
Fraud 
ln(crime) 
(12) 
Other 
theft 
ln(crime) 
ln(crime) (lag 1) 0.4183*** 
(0.0538) 
0.4647*** 
(0.0320) 
0.9128** 
(0.3767) 
0.1663** 
(0.0769) 
0.4019** 
(0.1590) 
0.8538*** 
(0.0927) 
ln(crime) (lag 2)  0.2455*** 
(0.0338) 
  0.2127* 
(0.1155) 
 
ln(proceed_FCAN)  -0.0028** 
(0.0013) 
-0.1705 
(1.0679) 
-0.0071 
(0.0089) 
-0.0010 
(0.0007) 
-0.1340 
(0.2270) 
ln(narcotics) -0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0049 
(0.0321) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0013 
(0.0032) 
ln(unemployment) 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0075) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0009 
(0.0010) 
0.0040 
(0.0064) 
_year1997 0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
 0.0001 
(0.0007) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
_year1998 -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0013 
(0.0078) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 0.0020 
(0.0032) 
_year1999  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0046 
(0.0273) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0037 
(0.0057) 
_year2000 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0027 
(0.0158) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
|(0.0003) 
0.0039 
(0.0057) 
_year2001 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0006 
(0.0022) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0016 
(0.0041) 
_year2002 0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0006 
(0.0031) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0014 
(0.0038) 
_year2003 0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0005 
(0.0031) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010 
(0.0035) 
_year2004 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0020) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0014 
(0.0045) 
_year2005 -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0036) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0015 
(0.0043) 
_year2006 0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0008 
(0.0044) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0021 
(0.0046) 
_year2007 0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005 
(0.0033) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0019 
(0.0049) 
_year2008 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007 
(0.0051) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0012 
(0.0038) 
_year2009 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0010 
(0.0069) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0019 
(0.0045) 
_year2010 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004*** 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0019 
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(0.0002) (0.0035) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0044) 
_year2011 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0030) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0018 
(0.0042) 
_year2012 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004 
(0.0032) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0015 
(0.0040) 
_year2013 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0006 
(0.0041) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0017 
(0.0044) 
Observations 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
2450 2165 2121 2587 2610 
Groups 2470 154 151 150 154 154 
F-statistics 152 F(21, 154) 
= 92.4900 
F(21, 151) 
= 14.0100 
F(21, 150) 
= 4.5000 
F(20, 154) 
= 7.3800 
F(21, 154) 
= 33.7800 
Prob > F F(21, 152) 
= 14.0200 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 1)) 
0.0000 [1, 1] [6, 7] [1, 1] [2, 2] [5, 6] 
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 2)) 
[1, 3] [1, 1]     
Lag limits 
(ln(crime) (lag 3)) 
    [2, 5]  
Lag limits (other) [1, 3] [1, 4] [6, 6] [2, 4] [1, 2] [2, 3] 
Instrument count 29 30 22 27 26 25 
Arellano-Bond tests       
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000 0.0000 0.8700 0.0000 0.0000 0.2510 
AR(2) Prob > z = 0.9700 0.1310 0.8770 0.8590 0.0790 0.4020 
AR(3) Prob > z = 0.1000 0.9310 0.7240 0.1520 0.4550 0.8360 
Hansen test Prob > 
𝜒2 = 
0.2550 0.9570 0.4700 0.4340 0.3890 0.8550 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
